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 This article examines the interwoven history of University of Toronto economics professor-
turned-business consultant Gilbert Jackson (1890-1959) and the Canadian Committee 
on Industrial Reconstruction (CCIR), an organization established by a small group of 
leading Canadian business executives in 1943. Unknown to the general public of the 
period, the CCIR financed Jackson to prepare studies and deliver speeches at a time when 
many corporate leaders believed that the spectre of socialism posed an imminent threat. 
This secretive political mobilization was intended to shape the formation of “expert 
opinion” as a means to exercising political influence. A deliberate campaign to manage 
democracy from above, it altered the political tactics of the business elite by ascribing 
a greater role and more autonomy to the expert-intellectual. Jackson’s intellectual out-
put and role in the CCIR shared much in common with the contemporaneous activities 
of early neoliberals in Europe and the United States and presaged the proliferation of 
advocacy think tanks during the second half of the twentieth century, part of “a new 
technology of persuasion” that was reshaping the form of elite politics in Canada much 
earlier than is posited in existing scholarship. 
 L’article examine l’histoire entrelacée de Gilbert Jackson (1890-1959), professeur 
d’économie à l’Université de Toronto devenu conseiller en affaires, et du Canadian 
Committee on Industrial Reconstruction (CCIR), une organisation qu’avaient lancée un 
petit groupe de dirigeants d’entreprise canadiens en 1943. Ce qu’ignorait alors le grand 
public, c’est que le CCIR payait Jackson pour faire des études et prononcer des discours 
à une époque où bon nombre de chefs d’entreprise craignaient le spectre du socialisme, y 
voyant menace imminente. Cette mobilisation politique secrète visait à mouler « l’opinion 
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des experts » dans le but d’exercer une influence politique. Tentative délibérée de gérer 
la démocratie d’en haut, cette campagne a transformé la façon pour l’élite des affaires 
de se mobiliser politiquement en conférant un plus grand rôle et davantage d’autonomie 
à l’expert-intellectuel. La production intellectuelle et le rôle de Jackson au sein du 
CCIR avaient beaucoup en commun avec les activités contemporaines des premiers 
néolibéraux de l’Europe et des États-Unis et laissaient présager la prolifération des 
cercles de réflexion partisane durant la seconde moitié du XX e siècle dans le cadre d’une 
« nouvelle technologie de la persuasion » qui remodelait la politique de l’élite au Canada 
beaucoup plus tôt qu’on ne le postule dans les écrits savants existants. 
 THE REINVIGORATION of free-market ideas in the twentieth-century United 
States has become the subject of a vast literature, which has led to a greater rec-
ognition of the role of businesspeople in the American conservative movement.  1  
Important new work on the origins of neoliberalism has also underlined the role 
of businesspeople in sponsoring intellectual activity as well as the importance of 
intellectual-activists in championing neoliberal ideas through the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, a predominantly European and American group, founded in 1947, that 
became the core of an expanding web of think tanks in many parts of the globe 
in the postwar period.  2  Canada may appear a backwater to these historical devel-
opments, and indeed businesspeople and the trajectories of right-wing politics 
in twentieth-century Canada have to a considerable extent eluded the attention 
of social history and its methodologies.  3  Historians have typically emphasized 
the willingness of Canadian big business to support various forms of state inter-
vention during the 1930s and 1940s, suggesting that major business executives 
were mostly corporate liberals, not likely supporters of the free-market idealism 
associated with neoliberalism.  4  The rise of Keynesian liberalism and economic 
planning also remains a central theme in the historiography of twentieth-century 
Canada, deemed a signal moment in the making of modern Canadian society.  5  It 
 1  Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,”  Journal of American History , vol. 98, no. 3 (Decem-
ber 2011), p. 732. 
 2  Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, eds.,  The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal 
Thought Collective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). In the United States, powerful business 
interests, concerned with their own political vulnerability as well as the vulnerability of liberal capitalism, 
played an active role in financing intellectual activity in support of economic liberalism. For an examination 
of the crucial financial support of American businessmen towards the Mont Pèlerin Society, see Kim Phillips-
Fein,  Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the New Deal (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009), 
pp. 26-52, and “Business Conservatives and the Mont Pèlerin Society” in Mirowski and Plehwe, eds.,  The 
Road from Mont Pèlerin , pp. 280-301. 
 3  No Canadians played any significant role in the early history of the Mont Pèlerin Society. See Dieter Plehwe, 
“Introduction” in Mirowski and Plehwe, eds.,  The Road from Mont Pèlerin , pp. 16-17. Canadian social his-
tory’s relative inattention to the history of elites and the political right was the recent subject of an online post 
by Tina Loo, “Unfinished History,” October 24, 2012, ActiveHistory.ca (accessed February 16, 2013). 
 4  See Alvin Finkel,  Business and Social Reform in the Thirties (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1979); 
James Struthers,  No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981). 
 5  See J. L. Granatstein,  The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998 [1982]); Douglas Owram,  The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the 
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is, then, unsurprising to find that scholars generally consider the business elite’s 
conversion to free-market ideas a relatively recent historical phenomenon in 
Canada, linked to the emergence of neoliberal groups such as the Fraser Insti-
tute and the Business Council on National Issues during the 1970s and a small 
constellation of groups and people during the preceding decade.  6  Indeed, it has 
been argued that the Canadian reception of neoliberal ideas was tempered by a 
combination of factors, including the dependence of Canadian big business upon 
the state, which allegedly produced a type of neoliberalism less influenced by 
free-market idealism than in the United States.  7  Collectively, these accounts not 
only give the impression that Canada was an unlikely place for a proto-neoliberal 
mobilization when Keynesianism was on the rise during the 1940s; they also 
suggest that Canadian big business would have been an unlikely source of sup-
port for such an effort. 
 Drawing upon the methods of social history, this study demonstrates that the 
activism of Canadian big business was more vigorous and innovative during the 
middle years of the twentieth century than has been typically assumed.  8  Estab-
lished by a small group of leading Montreal business executives in 1943, the 
Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction (CCIR) signalled an impor-
tant change in the political activism of the national business class at a time when 
many corporate leaders believed that the spectre of socialism posed an imminent 
threat. Rather than climbing the proverbial soapbox or attempting to work directly 
through politicians and political parties as they had done in the 1930s, business 
executives in the CCIR discussed matters behind closed doors and sponsored 
research under the auspices of experts, engaging the Toronto offices of Gilbert 
Jackson and Associates, the consulting firm of former University of Toronto 
economics professor Gilbert Jackson (1890-1959). In their efforts to revitalize 
free-market ideals by influencing prominent figures within the media, govern-
ment, and academia, Jackson and the CCIR pursued a strategy that would become 
increasingly common during the second half of the twentieth century with the 
  State, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Barry Ferguson,  Remaking Liberalism: The 
Intellectual Legacy of Adam Shortt, O. D. Skelton, W. C. Clark, and W. A. Mackintosh (Montreal and Kings-
ton: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993); Timothy Bruce Krywulak, “An Archeology of Keynesianism: 
The Macro-Political Foundations of the Modern Welfare State in Canada, 1896-1948” (PhD thesis, Carleton 
University, 2005); Robert A. Wardhaugh,  Behind the Scenes: The Life and Work of William Clifford Clark 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
 6  See William K. Carroll with Murray Shaw, “Consolidating a Neoliberal Policy Bloc, 1976-1996,”  Canadian 
Public Policy , vol. 27, no. 2 (2001), pp. 195-217; Gregory J. Inwood,  Continentalizing Canada: The Politics 
and Legacy of the Macdonald Royal Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), pp. 21 and 
23. 
 7  David Langille, “The Business Council on National Issues and the Canadian State,”  Studies in Political 
Economy , vol. 24 (Autumn 1987), pp. 41-85. 
 8  Differing from the earlier scholarship listed in the footnotes above, this article builds upon Don Nerbas, 
 Dominion of Capital: The Politics of Big Business and the Crisis of the Canadian Bourgeoisie, 1914-
1947 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming), which argues that the country’s big bourgeoisie 
remained significantly committed to classical liberal ideals and opposed to new forms of state intervention-
ism during the 1930s and 1940s. 
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proliferation of advocacy think tanks, a key feature in what Philip Mirowski has 
called “a new technology of persuasion.”  9  Gilbert Jackson was not a mere servant 
of the businesspeople who financed his research and supported its dissemina-
tion, however.  10  Through the CCIR, Jackson actively sought to organize Canadian 
big business and provide it with intellectual leadership. This new emphasis upon 
expert opinion altered the architecture of the business elite’s political mobiliza-
tion by ascribing a greater role and more autonomy to the expert-intellectual.  11  
 There is evidence to suggest that Jackson and the CCIR had a direct impact 
upon government policy and economic thought during the 1940s, but this study 
refrains from firm assertions about the organization’s political effectiveness or 
success. Rather, the argument centres upon the existence, form, and nature of 
Jackson’s work with the CCIR. Indeed, Jackson and the CCIR form an important 
historical link between conservative business magnates of the 1930s and business 
advocacy groups operating in the 1960s and 1970s such as the Canadian-American 
Committee and the C. D. Howe Institute. While Barry Ferguson, J. L. Granatstein, 
Douglas Owram, and other scholars have examined the rising influence of reform 
liberalism and Keynesianism within Canadian intellectual networks and its grow-
ing influence over state policy during the 1930s and 1940s, the persistence and fur-
ther development of a free-market liberalism during these years has failed to attract 
much scholarly attention.  12  Closely associated with a predominantly Montreal-
based faction of the Canadian bourgeoisie whose historic power within the coun-
try’s economic and political life had been seriously damaged during the 1930s and 
1940s, the CCIR is best understood as a defensive manoeuvre to carry forth free-
market, pro-business ideals into the postwar period. Jackson and the CCIR thus 
reveal a form of persistent class contention that defies the historiographical tropes 
of “Fordism” and the “postwar settlement.” It is necessary not to overstate the 
extent of the ideological conversion of big business to the state-managed capital-
ism of the period following the Second World War. Unlike in 1919, when business 
leaders and their political allies could mobilize the police power of the state to 
suppress an expansive and increasingly radical labour movement, by the 1940s the 
political power of Canadian big business was much more limited and tenuous. This 
narrowed the political alternatives open to business conservatives who remained 
substantially opposed to the enhanced position of organized labour and the new 
 9  Philip Mirowski, “Postface: Defining Neoliberalism” in Mirowski and Plehwe, eds.,  The Road from Mont 
Pèlerin , p. 432. See also Carroll, “Consolidating a Neoliberal Policy Bloc.” 
 10  As Dieter Plehwe, Bernard Walpen, and Gisela Neuhöffer note, intellectuals played an autonomous leader-
ship role in formulating and advancing neoliberal ideas; Jackson played a similar role within the CCIR. 
See “Reconsidering Neoliberal Hegemony” in Dieter Plehwe, Bernard Walpen, and Gisela Neuhöffer, eds., 
 Neoliberal Hegemony: A Global Critique (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 4-5. 
 11  The relative autonomy of intellectuals within the neoliberal movement is emphasized in the edited volumes: 
Plehwe, Walpen, and Neuhöffer, eds.,  Neoliberal Hegemony ; and Mirowski and Plehwe, eds.,  The Road 
from Mont Pèlerin . Intellectuals are presumed to possess rather less autonomy in David Harvey’s account of 
neoliberalism,  A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 12  See Granatstein,  The Ottawa Men ; Owram,  The Government Generation ; Ferguson,  Remaking Liberalism . 
See also Krywulak, “An Archeology of Keynesianism.” 
Managing Democracy, Defending Capitalism 177
prominence of Keynesian ideas.  13  At a time when their legitimacy was low and 
their ability to control – or capture – the public sphere had dissipated, prominent 
business executives continued the defence of free-market ideals through the CCIR 
in their ongoing war of position within Canadian society.  14  
 The liberalism that Jackson and the CCIR championed should not be confused 
with a dogmatic  laissez-faire anti-statism, however. Like neoliberal intellectuals 
and earlier Canadian business conservatives, Jackson and the CCIR accepted the 
practical necessity (and possible benefits) of state intervention; their defence of 
free-market ideals was really a defence of a particular vision of the state’s role in 
society. They accepted the state as a facilitator of the market and private enter-
prise, but strongly protested attempts to broaden and redefine its role under the 
Keynesian and social-democratic paradigm.  15  Though Jackson and members of 
the CCIR did not advance a self-conscious neoliberalism like the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, Jackson’s ideas and political strategies paralleled the international neo-
liberal movement in fundamental ways. 
 Indeed, Jackson’s “realist” view of democracy, which informed the strategies 
of the CCIR, was an important element in the broader neoliberal response to 
the ongoing political and ideological crisis of liberal capitalism that had been 
sparked by the Great Depression of the 1930s. As Mirowski notes, the “starting 
point of neoliberalism” arises from the admission, contrary to classical liberal 
doctrine, that the conditions for liberal society must be created through ongoing 
political intervention.  16  Gilbert Jackson firmly embraced this precept, viewing 
the masses as an ignorant and potentially dangerous political force in need of 
guidance from above, a belief similar to the widely known views of American 
public intellectual Walter Lippmann.  17  Jackson’s scepticism and even hostility 
 13  The political crisis of the Canadian bourgeoisie and relative decline of Montreal’s St. James Street are exam-
ined in Nerbas,  Dominion of Capital . The standard work on the “postwar settlement” is Peter S. McIn-
nis,  Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the Postwar Settlement in Canada, 1943-1950 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002). A useful overview and analysis of the “postwar settlement” and the era 
of Fordism can be found in Bryan D. Palmer,  Canada’s 1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 212-216. The suppression of the “labour revolt” during and 
immediately after the First World War is examined in Gregory S. Kealey, “State Repression of Labour and 
the Left in Canada, 1914-1920: The Impact of the First World War,”  Canadian Historical Review , vol. 73, 
no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 281-314. The important role of Winnipeg’s business elite in the suppression of 
the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike has been recently documented in Reinhold Kramer and Tom Mitchell, 
 When the State Trembled: How A. J. Andrews and the Citizens’ Committee Broke the Winnipeg General Strike 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
 14  This signalled a change from the nineteenth century and earlier twentieth century, when economic elites sought 
to control and capture the public sphere directly. On the bourgeoisie’s success in capturing the public sphere 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century in New York, see Sven Beckert, “Bourgeois Institution Builders: 
New York in the Nineteenth Century” in Sven Beckert and Julia Rosenbaum, eds.,  The American Bourgeoisie: 
Distinction and Identity in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 103-117. 
 15  As Mirowski notes, “A primary ambition of the neoliberal project is to  redefine the shape and functions of 
the state, not destroy it ” (“Defining Neoliberalism,” p. 436). 
 16  Mirowski, “Defining Neoliberalism,” p. 434. 
 17  See Walter Lippmann,  Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan Company, 1922). For an illuminating discussion 
of the changing ideas of American intellectuals regarding the public, see Leon Fink,  Progressive Intellectuals 
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towards political democracy form part of a longer and more widespread historical 
tension between capitalism and democracy, but this tension assumed more subtle 
forms in elite political interventions in advanced capitalist countries during the 
1940s and afterwards, such as those of Jackson and well-known neoliberal think-
ers like Friedrich A. von Hayek. It was also evident in “progressive” organizations 
such as the Brookings Institution in the United States, which evinced a similar 
“suspicion toward democracy and the electorate” as threats to the free-enterprise 
system.  18  Jackson and his business patrons addressed a political environment, as 
did businesspeople and neoliberal intellectuals in the United States and Europe 
during the 1940s, in which popular left-wing political mobilizations appeared 
to threaten liberal-capitalist society. Their renovation of political practices and 
thinking was intended to rescue and revitalize liberal capitalism through an ongo-
ing management of democracy that treated the public sphere less as a forum for 
rational debate and deliberation, as classically conceived, and more as an arena 
for the necessary manipulation and moulding of public opinion.  19  In this way, 
they sought to resolve the historic tension between capitalism and democracy by 
attempting to alter the practice and conception of the latter to serve the former.  20  
  and the Dilemmas of Democratic Commitment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 13-51. 
Walter Lippmann’s  An Inquiry into the Principles of The Good Society (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1937), an effort to update and defend the liberal doctrines of a market-based society, became a foundational 
text of neoliberalism. See Plehwe, “Introduction,” p. 13. 
 18  Donald T. Chritchlow,  The Brookings Institution, 1916-1952: Expertise and the Public Interest in Demo-
cratic Society (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 1985), p. 147. For discussion of the direct opposition of 
bourgeoisies in Europe and the United States to democracy, see David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley,  The 
Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984); Sven Beckert, “Democracy and its Discontents: Contesting Suffrage Rights 
in Gilded Age New York,”  Past and Present , vol. 174, no. 1 (2002), pp. 116-157. For the decline of bour-
geois liberalism and the bourgeoisie’s reaction against democracy in Europe, see Eric Hobsbawm,  The Age 
of Empire, 1815-1914 (London: Abacus, 1994 [1987]), pp. 97-111; Charles S. Maier,  Recasting Bourgeois 
Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decades After World War I (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975). Hayek’s “double truth” doctrine conveyed clearly the perceived need to manage 
public opinion in a democratic society. See Mirowski, “Defining Neoliberalism,” pp. 440-446. The tension 
between free-market capitalism and political democracy is also taken up in Karl Polanyi’s classic,  The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time , introduction by R. M. MacIver (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1957 [1944]). 
 19  The early neoliberals of the Mont Pèlerin Society “consciously sought to remain out of the public eye” 
(Mirowski, “Defining Neoliberalism,” p. 430). Phillips-Fein’s important book,  Invisible Hands , also dem-
onstrates the political adaptations of business conservatives in the United States following their failed oppo-
sition to the New Deal during the 1930s. Commercial advertising became an especially important form 
of political persuasion in the West during this period. See, for example, Roland Marchand,  Creating the 
Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998); David Clampin and Ron Noon, “The Maverick Mr. Cube: The Resur-
gence of Commercial Marketing in Postwar Britain,”  Journal of Macromarketing , vol. 31, no. 1 (2011), pp. 
19-31. For the emergence of the public sphere in Canada during the early nineteenth century, see Jeffrey L. 
McNairn,  The Capacity to Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative Democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
 20  In particular, a classical feature of Canadian democracy that posed a problem to big business was suspicion 
of large concentrations of wealth, viewed by nineteenth-century democrats such as William Lyon Mackenzie 
as a potential threat to democracy. See Allan Greer, “Historical Roots of Canadian Democracy,”  Journal of 
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 Gilbert Jackson’s early intellectual and political inclinations may have made him 
an unlikely candidate for his eventual work with the CCIR. Born at Hedon-in-
Holderness, Yorkshire, England, in 1890, Jackson was the son of a medical doc-
tor and the recipient of a solidly middle-class upbringing. He attended boarding 
school at Denstone College before embarking upon higher learning at St. John’s 
College, University of Cambridge, in 1907. In these years, Jackson became 
actively involved in the Liberal party, gaining membership in the Eighty Club, 
“the senior club of the Liberal Party, dedicated to the education of the elector-
ate in Liberal principles, between elections.”  21  He received a Bachelor of Arts 
from Cambridge in 1911 and left for Canada that year to take up the position of 
Lecturer in Economics at the University of Toronto. He was then a left-leaning 
liberal; a University of Toronto colleague reminisced that Jackson “had come 
from Cambridge a mild socialist.”  22  During the First World War, in 1916, he left 
his academic post to join the British Army, serving in Mesopotamia before his 
discharge in 1919. Jackson returned to the University of Toronto’s Department 
of Political Economy after the war.  23  He moved easily between Canada and Brit-
ain, his fundamental frame of reference not a particular country but the British 
Empire. He would later declare before an audience of British schoolboys that 
travelling to the “farthest points of the Empire to gain experience and under-
standing” was “of vital importance in keeping the British Empire together.”  24  
His British Empire was classically liberal and progressive – a beacon of uni-
versal material and spiritual advancement, rooted in the imagined experience of 
the nineteenth century. Firmly located in this British liberal tradition, Jackson’s 
early involvement with the Workers’ Educational Association, which he helped 
establish in Canada, and editorship of the  Canadian Forum from 1920 to 1924 
(serving as chairman from 1920 to 1922) reflected his progressive outlook after 
the First World War.  25  
 However, like other progressive intellectuals, Jackson emerged from the 
experience of the Great War – in the wake of the jingoist uproars it provoked, 
  Canadian Studies , vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 7-26. Shirley Tillotson has examined a different sort of 
post-Second-World-War experiment in democracy in  The Public at Play: Gender and the Politics of Recre-
ation in Post-War Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), which traces how bureaucratization 
could overwhelm democratization. 
 21  University of Toronto Archives, Gilbert Edward Jackson Papers [hereafter JP], B 2004-0019, box 1, file 1, 
Autobiographical Note, n.d. 
 22  Vincent Bladen,  Bladen on Bladen: Memoirs of a Political Economist (Toronto: Scarborough College, Uni-
versity of Toronto, 1978), p. 32. 
 23  Ian M. Drummond with William Kaplan,  Political Economy at the University of Toronto: A History of the 
Department, 1888-1982 (Toronto: Faculty of Arts and Science, University of Toronto, 1983), pp. 55 and 170. 
 24  JP, box 1, file 17, clipping,  Walsall Times & Advertiser (1937), p. 7. 
 25  Bladen,  Bladen on Bladen , p. 32; Queen’s University Archives, Charles Dunning Papers [hereafter DP], 2121, 
box 25, file 225, clipping, C. B. Macpherson, “Lecture Statement Explained,”  Globe and Mail (Toronto), 
March 3, 1947. See also Ian Radforth and Joan Sangster, “‘A Link Between Labour and Learning’: The 
Workers’ Educational Association in Ontario, 1917-1951,”  Labour/Le Travailleur , vol. 8/9 (Autumn/Spring 
1981/1982), pp. 41-78. 
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spurred along by propaganda – with a deep distrust of the public’s capacity to 
make responsible political decisions.  26  Jackson articulated this hardened sense 
of realism in a short article published in the November 1920 issue of the  Cana-
dian Forum . “The War may have weakened our faith in many things,” wrote 
Jackson, 
 but it greatly strengthened the belief in propaganda. At one time, not far distant, it 
was supposed that our liberties as freemen were protected by an active and intelli-
gent public opinion. Governments bowed, and politicians cringed before it. Here in 
Canada we held it not a little reverence; and our more impressionable neighbours 
to the south (at least when they were called to public office) spoke of the Voice of 
the People as the Voice of God. Those halcyon days are over; maturity has made 
an end of this illusion. We know that the public cannot be trusted to itself to make 
up its mind. Its opinion, like the potter’s clay, waits for moulding which shall 
give it form and purpose. And just as the potter who moulds it is of much more 
importance than his clay, so we may infer that an artist in publicity, moulding what 
is still politely described as public opinion, is of much more importance than the 
thing he controls.  27  
 Jackson thus perceived the arrival of a new era, which would be shaped more 
directly by the “artist in publicity,” whose sense of purpose emerged from the 
discovery “that the public cannot be trusted to itself to make up its mind.” 
 During the 1920s and 1930s, Jackson developed closer associations with 
the business world. Appointed as the Bank of Nova Scotia’s first economist in 
1927 and representing the Canada Cement Company before the Tariff Advisory 
Board the following year, Jackson used his expanding connections with the busi-
ness community to secure job placements for University of Toronto commerce 
graduates.  28  Harold Innis, Jackson’s department colleague at the University of 
Toronto, viewed these connections with suspicion, but Jackson’s involvement 
with business expanded during the Great Depression of the 1930s. In 1934 he was 
working for Eaton’s, preparing a statement for the retailing giant in its defence 
before the muckraking Special Committee on Price Spreads and Mass Buying.  29  
Indeed, Jackson responded to the political and economic circumstances of the 
Great Depression with a forceful defence of economic liberalism and condemna-
tion of the unreliability of public opinion, indicative of his drift to the right. For 
Jackson, the market economy represented a moral order; economic questions 
were inseparable from moral ones, and from his perspective Canada was threat-
ening to fall into a moral abyss. 
 26  Fink,  Progressive Intellectuals , pp. 26-37. 
 27  G. E. Jackson, “What the Public Need,”  Canadian Forum , vol. 1, no. 2 (November 1920), p. 42. 
 28  JP, box 9, file 13, “Cement Makers Fear Effect of Duty Removal,”  Montreal Gazette , September 27, 1928, 
p. 1; Drummond,  Political Economy at the University of Toronto , pp. 56 and 69-70. 
 29  Drummond,  Political Economy at the University of Toronto , p. 56; Bladen,  Bladen on Bladen , pp. 41 and 69; 
JP, box 9, file 13, “The Place of the Department Store in Canadian Economic Life,” Ottawa, June 7, 1934. 
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 He articulated this sense of alarm in a book published in 1935 titled  An Econ-
omist’s Confession of Faith , mostly a collection of past speeches. Claiming that 
“economics is an exemplification of moral law,” Jackson declared “national-
ism and speculative greed” the main causes of the Great Depression: the for-
mer inhibiting commerce and the latter luring capital away from “the trade of 
the world,” causing its breakdown.  30  Society’s way out rested with individuals, 
who might form a movement that “aims to drive out selfishness from the heart 
of man and condemns the nationalist expression of selfishness in armed war-
fare and tariff warfare.”  31  He understood these moral beliefs within a classical 
British liberal tradition, articulating  laissez-faire ideals – cast in the language 
of “Britishness” – that continued to hold considerable sway among Canadian 
business conservatives; he would later playfully declare himself “a blend of 
those two deplorable products of evolution, Old Yorkshire and the Nineteenth 
Century.”  32  For Jackson and many business conservatives in Canada, the British 
tradition was inimical to state intervention.  33  “Our British way has been to put 
our trust in character,” proclaimed Jackson, “not in legislation.”  34  Indeed, he 
viewed the British government’s fiscally austere policies during the Depression 
as evidence of the British people’s “wonderful readiness to follow strong lead-
ership” and willingness to sacrifice in the interest of economic recovery.  35  By 
contrast, Jackson believed that, under Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
the United States was following a course that not only stood to disrupt economic 
recovery but also threatened to diminish individual freedom.  36  Capitalism, he 
argued, gives people the “priceless liberty” of the market economy: “My five 
dollars are five votes in a continuous referendum.”  37  While Jackson celebrated 
the market as a mechanism of “priceless liberty,” he remained deeply suspi-
cious of the political instincts of the general public, “whose opinion, stupid, 
lethargic and timid, sets limits to what the most energetic and awake of Govern-
ments can do.”  38  He complained that there was “not one person in ten thousand 
who possess a detailed, scientific understanding of capitalism’s instability. But 
all ... are eagerly discussing remedies; and discussing them in a state of hopeless 
ignorance.”  39  Meanwhile, the speechifying of most politicians in most countries 
 30  Gilbert E. Jackson,  An Economist’s Confession of Faith (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 
1935), pp. 29-34. 
 31  Ibid. , p. 37. 
 32  DP, box 25, file 223, Gilbert E. Jackson, “Canadian Capitalism and the Menace of a Fifth Column,” Address 
to the Rotary Club of Montreal, March 12, 1946. 
 33  See, for example, Don Nerbas, “Howard Robinson and the ‘British Method’: A Case Study of Britishness in 
Canada during the 1930s and 1940s,”  Journal of the Canadian Historical Association , vol. 20, no. 1 (2009), 
pp. 139-160. 
 34  Jackson,  An Economist’s Confession of Faith , p. 107. 
 35  Ibid. , p. 51. 
 36  Ibid. , pp. 50-58. 
 37  Ibid. , p. 75. 
 38  Ibid. , p. 68. 
 39  Ibid. , p. 77. 
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resembled “the nostrums of a patent medicine vendor at a country fair.”  40  Within 
this world of overwrought political appeals, believed Jackson, the disinterested 
practitioners of economics could serve a vital role.  41  Jackson’s confession of 
faith in economic liberalism paralleled the ideas of early neoliberals, who, like 
him, combined a highly constructivist notion of political rule with a naturalized 
depiction of the market economy. 
 In September 1935 the  New York Times described  An Economist’s Confession 
of Faith as an “unconventional [book] to come from the pen of a professionally 
successful economist,” but “[f]or that reason ... all the more worth attention.”  42  
Jackson had earlier in the year relinquished his positions with the University of 
Toronto and the Bank of Nova Scotia to become Advisor to the Governors of 
the Bank of England in London. Within four years, in January 1939, he filed 
his resignation, having made plans to move back to Canada to set up a consult-
ing business, with retainers already secured from the Canadian Pacific Railway 
(CPR), Canada Packers, and Canadian Industries Limited. As Jackson reported 
to  Financial Post editor Floyd Chalmers, “I shall be ... doing the same kind of 
work as I did for a number of years before coming to London in 1935.” Jackson 
had been “mediating something of the sort for ten years past,” preferring “inde-
pendent professional work than being a wage-earner, even in gilded surround-
ings and among delightful people.”  43  
 Jackson shared the general political priorities of his Canadian clientele. Since 
the onset of the Great Depression, the national business elite had remained stub-
bornly attached to a classical liberal interpretation of the Depression, which 
emphasized the need to rein in government deficits through retrenchment. CPR 
president Edward Beatty led the campaign of big business towards this end. 
(Not incidentally, the railways were central to this debate.) Faced with a pub-
lic largely hostile to them and their views, however, Beatty and his St. James 
Street allies attempted to encourage the formation of a nonpartisan “National 
Government” that would combine the country’s two major national parties into 
a government insulated from the democratic constraints of party politics. Such 
efforts to transcend partisan politics not only failed; they evidenced the failure of 
business executives to have their conservative agenda embraced by either major 
national party. By the latter half of the 1930s, the emergence of industrial union-
ism combined with persisting concerns about taxation, government spending, 
and Canada’s relationship to the British Empire to hasten the political isola-
tion of conservative business leaders, who ineffectively struggled to rehabilitate 
the rugged liberal individualism that continued to shape their world view. After 
the onset of the Second World War, Arthur Meighen’s resurrection as leader of the 
Conservative party in 1942 was a short-lived victory for business conservatives, 
 40  Ibid. , p. 160. 
 41  Ibid. , pp. 64-65, 149-173, and  passim . 
 42  “Ethics and Economics,”  New York Times , September 1, 1935, p. BR 12. 
 43  JP, box 14, file 1, Jackson to Floyd Chalmers, January 6, 1939; Jackson to Gordon Taylor, January 6, 1939; 
and Jackson to Vernon Mackenzie, January 11, 1939. 
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but his defeat in a by-election that February to a socialist candidate represented 
a crippling defeat. With the strength of organized labour growing and a socialist 
political party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), emerging 
as a serious challenger to the established Liberal and Conservative parties at 
the national level, Canada’s political landscape was undergoing a significant 
leftward transformation.  44  
 II 
 The new political tenor of the times was sounded in March 1943 when the gov-
ernment-appointed Advisory Committee on Reconstruction released what would 
become commonly known as the Marsh Report, authored by the former Director 
of Social Research at McGill University, Leonard Marsh. A graduate of the Lon-
don School of Economics and former member of the left-wing League for Social 
Reconstruction, Marsh embraced a Keynesian view of the state’s responsibili-
ties in economic and social life, and the Marsh Report articulated a vision of a 
considerably expanded state role in providing social security, similar to the Bev-
eridge Report in Britain.  45  Known as the James Committee, after its chairman 
and McGill principal Cyril James, the Advisory Committee on Reconstruction 
was composed of non-government personnel operating outside the influential 
circle of bureaucrats who played a major role in directing government policies 
during the 1940s. Historians have tended to view the James Committee as a 
relatively unimportant group, one that provided “testimony to the interconnected 
nature of reform thought in Canada,” but whose most enduring achievement was 
the production of the Marsh Report itself.  46  However, on the heels of the report’s 
release, another political project – born of dramatically different priorities – was 
being organized by leading business executives in association with the James 
Committee. 
 On April 7, 1943, Morris Wilson, the president of Canada’s largest bank, the 
Royal Bank of Canada, wrote privately to Ogilvie Flour Mills Company presi-
dent Charles Dunning. Wilson explained that he was setting up a meeting of “a 
small group of industrialists and others” to discuss with Cyril James “their rela-
tions to his work as Chairman of the Reconstruction Committee.” “It is expected 
that there will be with us Mr. Gilbert Jackson, the well-known economist,” 
 44  These events are examined in detail in Nerbas,  Dominion of Capital . For Meighen’s attempted political 
resurrection, see J. L. Granatstein, “The York South By-Election of February 9, 1942: A Turning Point in 
Canadian Politics,”  Canadian Historical Review , vol. 48, no. 2 (June 1967), pp. 142-155. For labour and the 
rise of the CCF during the Second World War, see Desmond Morton,  Working People: An Illustrated History 
of the Canadian Labour Movement , 5 th ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 
pp. 165-186; Walter D. Young,  The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 103-119. 
 45  Leonard Marsh,  Report on Social Security for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973 [1943]). 
 46  Owram,  The Government Generation , p. 282. See also Granatstein,  The Ottawa Men , pp. 161-163; Robert 
A. Young, “Reigning in James: The Limits of the Taskforce,”  Canadian Public Administration , vol. 24, no. 4 
(Winter 1981), pp. 596-611. 
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noted Wilson.  47  James had, months earlier, expressed the view that businessmen 
should develop and present their own plans to the committee, whose members 
were unanimous in supporting the establishment of a Subcommittee on Indus-
trial Reconstruction.  48  On March 17, sugar magnate and newspaper proprietor 
J. W. McConnell had hosted a luncheon in Montreal attended by Cyril James 
and a small group of leading business executives, consisting of Morris Wilson, 
Charles Dunning, Stelco president Ross McMaster, Dominion Textile Company 
president Blair Gordon, and Canadian Industries Limited president George W. 
Huggett. At the end of lunch, James “invited them to serve as members of the 
new Subcommittee.” Unlike other subcommittees that had been established in 
association with the James Committee, this moneyed group would finance its 
own activities, setting a course for its extended and independent afterlife.  49  Gil-
bert Jackson worked with Cyril James in July to draft a memorandum outlin-
ing the set-up of the Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction as an 
informal committee established to “study the problems that will be encountered 
by manufacturing industries throughout the Dominion of Canada in connection 
with the termination of hostilities,” as well as to confer with governmental agen-
cies working on a range of problems associated with the transition from war to 
peace.  50  While the James Committee released its final report in September, the 
CCIR “held its first formal meeting in the Council Room of the Arts Building at 
McGill University” that month, quickly developing a momentum and purpose 
of its own, with Jackson already at work carrying out the Committee’s research 
programme.  51  
 Charles Dunning played a particularly crucial role in the Committee and 
epitomized its political priorities. Once a farmers’ representative and general 
manager of the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company, Premier of Sas-
katchewan, and Minister of Finance and Railways and Canals in the Dominion 
government, Dunning had been quick to assimilate into the charmed world of 
St. James Street when given the opportunity after his defeat in the 1930 federal 
election, becoming closely associated with the CPR. When he re-entered Mack-
enzie King’s Liberal administration as Minister of Finance in 1935, it was as a 
representative of big business. The strain of the position proved too much; after 
suffering a heart attack in the Parliament building in 1938, Dunning retreated 
from active politics the following year, having struggled in government while the 
economy remained in the doldrums and while Keynesian ideas slowly crept their 
way into official policy. Not long after, he was appointed president of Ogilvie 
Flour Mills and gained directorships with numerous leading companies such as 
 47  DP, box 23, file 216, Morris Wilson to Charles Dunning, April 7, 1943. 
 48  David Bright, “Planning to Plan: Cyril James, the Ottawa Mandarins and the Committee on Reconstruction, 
1941-1943” (MA thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 2005), p. 118; DP, box 42, file 348, Cyril James, 
“The Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction,” November 29, 1945, p. 3. 
 49  James, “The Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction,” p. 4. 
 50  DP, box 23, file 216, Memorandum, “The Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction,” n.d. [internal 
evidence indicates that the document was produced July 12, 1943]. 
 51  James, “The Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction,” p. 6. 
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the Bank of Montreal, the CPR, and Stelco. Remaining deeply committed to the 
rugged individualism of nineteenth-century liberalism, Dunning’s retreat from 
politics was not permanent; he played the lead role in founding the CCIR, serv-
ing as its chairman and assuming an important role in establishing its direction.  52  
 Dunning was troubled by the leftward shift in national politics, which had 
reached new heights by 1943. He conceived of the Committee as “a private and 
independent ‘shadow cabinet’ of responsible citizens, who would themselves 
study, and cause to be studied, problems of Canadian interest affecting the busi-
ness and industrial community”; the group would also “disseminate its find-
ings to other interested persons and to the public.”  53  Joining Dunning on the 
group’s executive committee was the treasurer, Morris Wilson, and three other 
St. James Street moguls: Blair Gordon, Ross McMaster, and J. W. McConnell.  54  
A Toronto subcommittee was also established, originally consisting of Hugh 
Lawson of York Knitting Mills, Canada Packers president J. Stanley McLean, 
Massey-Harris Company president James S. Duncan, and Gilbert Jackson.  55  A 
membership fee of $2,000 per year was established to finance the work of the 
Committee, to “consist of not more than 25 members”; research was to be car-
ried out by Jackson and a research associate, Stuart Armour.  56  “We are not trying 
to reconcile differences of view between different classes of the community but 
are trying to discover economic facts,” wrote Dunning to Jackson.  57  Viewing the 
state’s growing scope of activity as an infringement upon individual freedom, 
private property, and initiative, these business executives supported the CCIR in 
an effort to assert more control over government policy and restore a free-market 
philosophy.  58  
 They found an invaluable and deeply committed ally in Gilbert Jackson. He 
too had become deeply troubled by the growing acceptance of Keynesianism 
and economic planning; “for those of us who regard with suspicion the propa-
ganda for a planned economy,” said Jackson in a lecture at McGill University in 
1941, “for those of us who have cherished economic freedom almost as much 
as we have cherished political freedom – for us, the days to come are likely to 
be depressing days.” Jackson had become concerned about the spectre of creep-
ing socialism in Canada, viewing it – in much the same way as Friedrich Hayek 
would soon famously characterize it in  The Road to Serfdom – as “a jump towards 
 52  Don Nerbas, “The Politics of Capital: The Crisis and Transformation Canada’s Big Bourgeoisie” (PhD thesis, 
University of New Brunswick, 2010), pp. 110-189. 
 53  DP, box 19, file 176, quoted in “The Council and its Work, Past and Prospects,” Annual Report of the Chair-
man, Mr. H. G. Hilton, to the Council meeting in Toronto on June 2 nd , 1955. 
 54  Soon J. W. McConnell requested that he be replaced on the executive committee by J. D. Johnson, president 
of Canada Cement; McConnell believed it “unwise to have a newspaper publisher on this Executive Com-
mittee.” See DP, box 23, file 216, McConnell to Dunning, October 20, 1943. 
 55  DP, box 23, file 216, Dunning to Morris Wilson, October 8, 1943. 
 56  DP, box 23, file 216, Morris Wilson to Dunning, September 21, 1943; DP, box 42, file 347, Minutes, Meeting 
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 57  DP, box 23, file 216, Dunning to Jackson, October 13, 1943. 
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totalitarianism.”  59  While the formation of the CCIR emerged out of the immedi-
ate political concerns of Canada’s big bourgeoisie, Jackson held the intellectual 
resources and reputation that would expand the Committee’s reach and shape its 
purpose and strategies. Viewing the market economy as a mechanism of liberty 
and social order, he instilled in the CCIR its programmatic ideological mission 
to direct its energies towards the broad aim of revitalizing doctrines of economic 
freedom. In general intellectual outlook, strategies, and goals, Jackson was a 
neoliberal  avant la lettre in Canada; as did the international movement, he found 
eager support from moneyed businesspeople worried about the survival of eco-
nomic liberalism and capitalism, epitomizing a classic alliance of the “neoliberal 
thought collective” between businesspeople and intellectuals closely associated 
with the discipline of economics.  60  
 III 
 Jackson’s ideological coalescence with the business executives who sponsored 
his work was considerable, but as Jackson surveyed the business community’s 
postwar planning efforts in 1943, he painted a pessimistic picture. Little work 
had been done, and organizations such as the National Construction Association 
were pressing “limited aims,” “looking to Government for their most lucrative 
opportunities.”  61  Jackson made contact with numerous trade and business asso-
ciations, while Ross McMaster and Canada Cement Company president J. D. 
Johnson were soon dispatched to survey the difficulties within the construction 
industry.  62  “The construction men in general seem to think of little but securing 
great contracts from governments ... and if I were a C.C.F. politician,” wrote 
Jackson to McMaster, “I would wave my hat and cheer them on.”  63  Jackson, from 
the beginning, was consciously engaged in the task of developing a campaign 
that would transcend the specific interests of particular firms or sectors to coor-
dinate and lead big business as a whole. Before the end of 1943, Jackson was 
working with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce to plan an economic survey 
of Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario, as a case study for postwar planning. It was 
completed the following year.  64  Jackson and Armour also worked in association 
with organizations such as the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association and the 
Primary Textiles Institute.  65  
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14, 1941, at McGill University, p. 8; Friedrich A. Hayek,  The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1944). 
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 Jackson looked to the Committee for Economic Development (the Hoffman 
Committee) in the United States as a template for defining various fields of activ-
ity. While the Hoffman Committee – established in 1942 under the leadership 
of Studebaker Corporation president Paul G. Hoffman – covered the fields of 
“research,” “local factual surveys,” and “propaganda supporting private enter-
prise,” Jackson believed the work could be divided among separate organizations 
in Canada, with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce managing local surveys 
and conducting “propagandist activities.”  66  Jackson became concerned, in par-
ticular, about the development of the National Industrial Federation (NIF), which 
had “grown out of the Heavy Industries Federation” in an effort to turn itself 
into a Canadian version of the Hoffman Committee. Though the organization 
included some prominent business figures such as Canadian General Electric 
vice-president H. M. Turner, Jackson believed that, essentially, “they have no 
money ... and no first-class people behind them.”  67  When an executive from Inter-
national Nickel, along with two associates from the NIF, met with Jackson and 
Armour to discuss the possibility of coordinating activities, Armour explained 
to them: “if the N.I.F. were to duplicate the Hoffman Committee’s activities, 
there would be definite overlapping both with the Canadian Chamber of Com-
merce, and with our own Committee.” “The visitors were visibly disappointed 
at this turn of the conversation,” reported Jackson.  68  J. D. Johnson similarly felt 
“that the National Industrial Federation was rather intruding into the field of the 
Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction,” and McMaster had already 
expressed his lack of “faith in the individuals composing the group.”  69  
 In opposing the expansion of the National Industrial Federation, the CCIR 
consolidated its position as the organ of the Canadian business elite. The Com-
mittee also embraced a decidedly conservative political mission, unlike the Hoff-
man Committee in the United States, which adopted a more flexible corporate 
liberalism. The CCIR was also unique in its narrow membership and secre-
tive nature.  70  By the end of 1944 the presidents of the Aluminum Company of 
Canada, the Bank of Montreal, Canada Cement, Canadian Industries Limited, 
Consolidated Mining & Smelting Company of Canada (Cominco), Dominion 
Steel & Coal Corporation, Ford Motor Company of Canada, General Motors of 
Canada, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company of Canada, Howard Smith Paper 
Company, and Noranda Mines were among the super-elite group of executives 
who made up the Committee’s personnel. These presidents of some of Canada’s 
 66  DP, box 23, file 216, Jackson to McMaster, December 4, 1943. 
 67  DP, box 23, file 217, Jackson to Dunning, February 2, 1944. 
 68  DP, box 23, file 216, Jackson to Dunning, December 27, 1943. 
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largest corporations collectively controlled billions of dollars.  71  In October of 
that year the Committee had decided to hold “informal meetings” once a month 
in Montreal and Toronto for discussion of “post-war problems and the Domin-
ion’s economic outlook.”  72  In the Committee, leading business executives were 
cultivating social relationships with their peers in an exclusive and informal set-
ting. When Ford Motor Company of Canada president Wallace Campbell tried 
to send a representative to a meeting on his behalf, Jackson was forced to protest 
on behalf of the Committee, writing privately to Campbell that sending a rep-
resentative “might threaten the basis of the relationship between members of 
the Committee, which is essentially personal.”  73  It would, Jackson reiterated to 
Dunning, spoil the “family feeling.”  74  The CCIR was more than a think tank; it 
was an elite social organization of corporate Canada. 
 Indeed, CCIR members were already interconnected through social and busi-
ness networks that continued to link together Canada’s big bourgeoisie during 
the 1940s. Through interlocking directorships, membership in elite social clubs, 
shared social habits, and their lead roles within the country’s major universities, 
these men perpetuated an elite world of a bourgeoisie pretty much exclusively of 
Anglo-Celtic descent.  75  The CPR, the Bank of Montreal, and the Sun Life Assur-
ance Company of Canada were the companies of most significant overlap within 
the Committee – evidence of the persisting importance of Montreal within Cana-
da’s economic elite. Ten of the nineteen CCIR members whose biographical data 
appeared in the 1943-1944  Who’s Who in Canada resided in Montreal.  76  Eleven 
were members of Montreal’s Mount Royal Club, which had been founded in 
1899 by leaders of the “CPR-Bank of Montreal group” who wished to develop 
a social club more exclusive than the existing St. James’s Club.  77  A further nine 
were members of the St. James’s Club and eight of Toronto’s York Club. By the 
1940s Charles Dunning had gravitated towards the very centre of this world. 
Dunning, based upon the  Who’s Who , sat on the boards of nine Canadian cor-
porations that overlapped with the directorships of other Committee members, 
and he also served as Chancellor of Queen’s University. The Committee also 
incorporated business executives of American branch companies, such as Wal-
lace Campbell, whose business career had been set within a corporate hierarchy 
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distant from the vibrant associational life of Canada’s bourgeoisie. In this way, 
the Committee sought to forge a new solidarity that reflected the changing – 
more North American – shape of Canadian big business. It was less successful 
in transcending its narrow regional and ethnic base; no French Canadians were 
members of the Committee, although the Committee worked with a French-
Canadian associate, Senator Léon Mercier Gouin, the son of former Quebec 
Premier Lomer Gouin.  78  
 IV 
 A detailed strategy had also emerged. Jackson and Armour had been preparing a 
series of memoranda on “a broad range of topics,” covering population growth, 
the construction industry, national income, and other issues. A report from the 
executive committee in September 1944 outlined a plan for disseminating these 
memoranda. It declared that “the Committee must alike in appearance and in fact 
abstain from partisanship or propaganda,” while making its studies available to 
“non-members ... to make use of this information for their own purposes in any 
manner that they may deem fit, without implicating the Committee,” expressing 
a purposeful awareness of the secretive nature of the Committee’s activities. 
While dissemination of the studies in academic circles was an aspect of the 
executive committee’s outlined strategy, the report articulated the view that a 
more immediate impact could be made through major newspapers and national 
magazines. Dunning and the executive committee hoped to make contact with 
these various groups participating “in the formation of public opinion at vari-
ous social and cultural levels.” In this way, the Committee could “disarm both 
the critics of planning by Business, and also those who claim that Business is 
incapable of planning,” while also creating “in the minds of the public a more 
realistic appreciation of Canada’s post-war problems.” Gilbert Jackson was the 
person primarily responsible for carrying out this public relations drive.  79  The 
Committee adopted the strategy outlined in the report unanimously in October 
1944 and invited University of Toronto president Sidney Smith and Queen’s 
University principal R. C. Wallace to join McGill’s Cyril James in the Commit-
tee as non-paying members – and the only non-business executives represented 
in the group.  80  
 The CCIR also fed its research to the newly created Department of Recon-
struction, which headed the government’s important task of managing the tran-
sition to a peacetime economy. In December, Dunning reported on a recent 
conversation with R. A. C. Henry, the department’s deputy minister, in which 
“it was agreed that the Committee should maintain the closest liaison with the 
 78  DP, box 24, file 220, Jackson to Dunning, April 30, 1945; Minutes, Executive Committee, Canadian Com-
mittee on Industrial Reconstruction, May 10, 1945. 
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new Ministry.”  81  Jackson was soon thereafter dispatched to Ottawa; he met with 
Henry and the department’s research director, Dr. W. A. Mackintosh, to share 
the Committee’s studies. After the meeting, Jackson believed the Committee’s 
studies would have an influence, although he thought future “missionary work” 
might perhaps be necessary.  82  As Stuart Armour would explain in private cor-
respondence in June 1945, “we had carefully kept away from the cabinet level 
of government, but ... we were in fairly close touch with those on the expert 
level.”  83  Although the original research programme of the Committee was highly 
detailed and technical, Jackson kept the focus upon the “fundamental trends 
of the Canadian economy.”  84  The Committee’s output sought to build a funda-
mental interpretation of the Canadian economy in a conscious political strategy 
to influence the “expert level” of policy formation, designed to work around 
political parties and their leaders – who, always susceptible to the vicissitudes 
of popular opinion, had proven unreliable political allies. Indeed, the executive 
committee had decided that “[n]o direct approaches should be made to leaders 
of political parties.”  85  
 “Memorandum V: Exports and the National Income of Canada” is an arche-
type of the Committee’s output. A highly technical study that set out to analyse 
the relationship between exports and Canada’s national income, the memoran-
dum was, according to Jackson, “a preface of studies to follow,” and he worked 
to disseminate it in the Department of Reconstruction.  86  Though not obviously 
political, the study offered an implicit rejection of Keynesian economic theory 
and its vision of consumer-driven growth: in effect, the document made the case 
that major Canadian exporters were the real driving force behind the national 
economy.  87  One of the implications of this finding, as Stuart Armour later put it 
at the 1945 meeting of the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs, was that “social 
security measures were no substitute for exports.”  88  Jackson believed this insight 
fundamental for W. A. Mackintosh and his work with the Department of Recon-
struction.  89  
 Indeed, Jackson had already produced a booklet entitled  Facts in the Case: A 
Manual for Canada’s Planners , which laid out his formulations in a more acces-
sible manner. The pink-covered booklet went through two printings in February 
and March 1944 and was reported to have had, along with other memoranda, 
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a significant impact within official circles.  90  Embracing the view of Canada as 
fundamentally an exporting nation, the booklet assailed the belief that “remedies 
applied internally” could compensate for diminishing exports. Given the direct 
link between exports and national income, argued Jackson, the path towards 
economic prosperity rested with industry’s competitiveness in uncertain export 
markets after the war, making it necessary “to keep down the costs of producing, 
transporting and distributing Canada’s wares.”  91  Jackson also warned that politi-
cal engineering to attain full employment and excessive wage demands from 
organized labour threatened to disrupt the framework for prosperity.  92  Although 
he sought to acknowledge “the necessity of a strong trade union movement” and 
claimed that “[t]he magnificent fight of the Russians has taught us that com-
munism does work,” these assertions were mere wartime window dressing to a 
store of ideas that were unrepentant in their doctrinaire economic liberalism.  93  
The booklet was a political tract, but one that offered a subtle form of political 
argumentation, which had eluded businessmen such as Edward Beatty during 
the 1930s. Jackson revealed his strategizing when Committee member S. G. 
Blaylock, Cominco chairman and president, questioned him on the booklet’s 
relatively positive depiction of Soviet Russia. As Jackson wrote, “my handling 
of Russia may give you the key to what I have been attempting all through the 
book.” He explained: 
 My purpose was “to take the pie out of the sky” for all those people who have 
been listening to the C.C.F. prophets.... Therefore I desired particularly to disarm 
a certain section of the readers, by taking as liberal an attitude to everything as 
one can honestly do. That is one of the reasons for my charitable remarks about 
the Russians; as also for my choice of a pink cover. Pink is a disarming shade – if 
you’re writing primarily for the “pinks.”  94  
 Purporting merely to provide “the facts in the case,” Jackson was engaged in a 
calculated political and ideological campaign in defence of liberal capitalism. 
 Canada Packers president J. Stanley McLean was one of the few voices within 
the CCIR to express opposition to Jackson’s strategy and the overall direction 
of the group’s activities. Uncomfortable with its elite composition and secre-
tive methods, McLean, who had been known for relative enlightenment on the 
“labour question” and had been the only business executive in the CCIR to have 
also sat on the government-appointed James Committee, wished for a more open 
and inclusive approach. In early 1944 McLean continued to argue that the “mem-
bership should be broadened to include representatives of smaller industrial 
 90  “Gilbert Jackson, Consulting Economist, Dies,”  Globe and Mail , June 17, 1959, p. 2. 
 91  Gilbert Jackson,  Facts in the Case: A Manual for Canada’s Planners (Ambassador Books, 1944), pp. 21 and 
32. 
 92  Ibid. , pp. 20 and 33-38. 
 93  Ibid. , pp. 26 and 36. 
 94  DP, box 23, file 218, Jackson to S. G. Blaylock, March 7, 1944. 
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businesses,” believing that there “was a new spirit abroad in the world, and that 
business must take cognizance of that fact.”  95  The experience of war produc-
tion had, according to McLean, freed society from “old economic limitations.”  96  
Jackson disagreed. “Something is happening in our times,” he wrote McLean, 
 to match the Fall of the Roman Empire – bigger than anything in the last fifteen 
hundred years. It is true that we know more engineering and chemistry now than 
men ever known before; but our fundamental problems are not technological. 
  You tend to think of Europe as a continent in which a lot of buildings have been 
smashed. I think of it as a continent in which your fundamental beliefs and mine 
have been smashed. These beliefs have to be restored, before we can have a sane 
world, or even renewed world trade. The task will take not one or two years, but at 
least one or two generations. 
 Jackson believed his familiarity with Europe made him more sensitive to the 
ideological threat than McLean, whose outlook, according to Jackson, was lim-
ited to that of “a business man in an orderly country, with a policeman direct-
ing traffic.” “[T]his is a revolutionary world,” declared Jackson to McLean: 
“If you had seen as many starving people as I have, or been in a few countries 
when revolution was simmering ‘under the lid,’ I think your eyesight would 
be different.”  97  However, Jackson’s argument for the necessity of a long-term 
strategy to renew economic liberalism failed to persuade McLean. Remain-
ing opposed to the methods and doctrinaire free-market philosophy prevailing 
within the Committee, McLean eventually resigned in 1945; “my view is not 
shared by other members of the Committee,” he wrote to Dunning.  98  McLean’s 
eventual resignation was symptomatic of the programmatic mission advanced 
by Jackson within the CCIR, which confirmed the collective political and ideo-
logical focus of the CCIR’s activities. 
 V 
 Government spending and taxation were particularly prominent areas of debate 
and gained an important place on the CCIR’s agenda, especially as the transition 
to a peacetime economy neared and the possibility of major government commit-
ments to social spending appeared possible.  99  In August 1945, shortly after the 
Liberal party victory in that year’s federal election, Mackenzie King’s administra-
tion tabled the Green Book proposals, which called for the creation of an advanced 
welfare state that would provide its citizens an array of social services, including 
 95  DP, box 23, file 217, Stuart Armour to Dunning, February 24, 1944; Morton,  Working People , p. 179. 
 96  DP, box 23, file 218, Jackson to Dunning, May 25, 1944. 
 97 DP, box 23, file 218, Jackson to J. S. McLean, letter draft, n.d. [internal evidence indicates that the letter was 
prepared in May 1944]. 
 98  DP, box 24, file 221, J. S. McLean to Dunning, May 19, 1945. 
 99  DP, box 24, file 221, Jackson to Dunning, February 1, 1944; DP, box 23, file 217, Armour to Duncan, Decem-
ber 13, 1944. 
Managing Democracy, Defending Capitalism 193
state-funded health care. “Altogether it looks to me like a proposal for a finan-
cial debauch,” complained Jackson, unimpressed by “the New Dealers whose 
thought now dominates Ottawa.”  100  By December, Stuart Armour reported that 
Oxford University Press was printing a memorandum that had originated with the 
Committee, entitled  Canada’s Burden of Taxation: Pre-War and Post-War .  101  The 
slim booklet – prepared, so the cover indicated, by Jackson’s consulting firm – 
offered a direct rebuttal to the Keynesian ideas that were helping to legitimate the 
expansion of government-funded social services and deficit spending. This trend 
towards new government responsibilities was being backed by strong left-wing 
mobilizations, including a labour movement that – with the doubling of union 
members in Canada between 1939 and 1945 – had gained significant strength dur-
ing the war; the political victory of the CCF in the predominantly rural province 
of Saskatchewan in 1944 was another source of the left’s political strength.  102  
These were trying times indeed for Canadian business conservatives. 
 Canada’s Burden of Taxation declared that implementation of the National 
Health Programme – together with other expenditures – would put taxation and 
government spending at dangerously high levels.  103  Such government expansion-
ism would not only “require from the citizens as taxpayers an undue proportion of 
their incomes,” but would “ultimately destroy the springs of enterprise; thus curtail-
ing within unnecessarily narrow limits, for the mass of its citizens, those opportuni-
ties of earning a living.”  104  Prepared explicitly “for post-war planners,” it declared 
that “the burden can only be lightened if the clamour of pressure groups is met with 
an uncompromising resistance.”  105  The state, in other words, needed to be insulated 
from popular pressure. This campaign apparently had an impact. Within a year 
Ross McMaster reported: “Our members, I believe, were amazed at the results of 
the forecast of the government budget included in the brochure on taxation. It was 
taken as a textbook by the press, and created widespread interest, even in govern-
ment circles.”  106  As Alvin Finkel has shown, Prime Minister King’s “growing sus-
picions of the economic theories underpinning the Green Book Proposals” led to 
his reluctance about the development of an advanced welfare state and ultimately 
helped insure that such a state was not built after the war.  107  The CCIR certainly 
played a role in contributing to a political and intellectual climate that encouraged 
this outcome, though the organization’s precise effectiveness is difficult to gauge. 
Whatever political effectiveness the CCIR achieved, it was not through chance, but 
 100  DP, box 24, file 220, Jackson to Dunning, August 16, 1945. 
 101  DP, box 23, file 219, Armour to Dunning, December 14, 1945. 
 102  Bryan D. Palmer,  Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991 
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1992), p. 279. 
 103  Canada’s Burden of Taxation: Pre-War and Post-War (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 9-14 
and  passim . 
 104  Ibid. , pp. 20 and 22. 
 105  Ibid. , p. 20. 
 106  DP, box 25, file 224, McMaster to Dunning, September 6, 1946. 
 107  Alvin Finkel, “Paradise Postponed: A Re-examination of the Green Book Proposals,”  Journal of the Cana-
dian Historical Association , vol. 4, no. 1 (1993), p. 125. 
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the product of calculated activism. Jackson and Armour had been busy at work car-
rying out the Committee’s public relations strategy throughout 1945. 
 On February 26, 1945, Jackson, Armour and Committee member Eric Phillips 
attended a dinner at the house of C. George McCullagh, the  Globe and Mail ’s 
president and publisher. The newspaper’s editor and a couple of its senior staff 
members were also present, along with Ontario Premier George Drew and his 
Conservative counterparts, George Hees (a former student of Jackson’s) and the 
prominent corporate lawyer and party fundraiser Henry Borden, the son of for-
mer Prime Minister Robert Borden. Jackson, Armour, and Phillips were there 
to discuss the Committee’s work. Though worried that “the discussion would 
be concerned largely with party politics,” Jackson was happy to report that 
“[t]here was no political colour at all to the night’s discussion.” “This has ‘bro-
ken the ice’,” he concluded, “so far as the daily press is concerned.”  108  Follow-
ing the meeting, Wellington Jeffers, the financial editor of the  Globe and Mail , 
“devoted the whole of his column on the financial page to the [Committee’s] 
research results.”  109  By this time Jackson and Armour had already had talks with 
several editors from the Maclean Publishing Company, publishers of  Maclean’s 
Magazine and the  Financial Post ; plans were also in the works to conduct dis-
cussions with B. K. Sandwell, editor of the national magazine  Saturday Night , 
and executives from the Consolidated Press. In the months that followed contact 
was made with numerous other media outlets, including major French-language 
dailies in Quebec such as  La Presse and  Le Devoir of Montreal.  110  
 During the early months of 1945 Jackson addressed 130 senior officers of 
the CPR, he spoke with business economists and executives at the Faculty Club 
of McGill, he addressed a meeting of between 400 and 500 businessmen at the 
University of Toronto under the auspices of the Advertising and Sales Club, and 
he remained in close contact with the Department of Reconstruction, among 
other activities.  111  Stuart Armour maintained a similarly busy schedule of speak-
ing engagements, and in the fall, according to a Committee report, “made a 
two-week trip to Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Edmonton, Vancouver, and Regina.... 
He spoke at two public meetings and six ‘off-the-record’ meetings of business 
newspaper editors; interviewed the daily newspaper publishers in all of the cities 
visited; and talked with the Presidents of the four western universities, and some 
of their economists.” The result of these vigorous efforts was an extensive net-
work of contacts that allowed the Committee to feed its studies to a wide range 
of individuals in positions of influence within the media, government, academia, 
and elsewhere. By the end of 1945 the Committee had collected 2,124 names for 
its English-language mailing list, including industrialists, federal and provincial 
government officials, government and academic economists, university officials, 
 108  DP, box 24, file 220, Jackson to Dunning, February 27, 1945. 
 109  DP, box 23, file 219, Bulletin No. 3, April 5, 1945. 
 110  Ibid. ; DP, box 23, file 219, Armour to J. W. McConnell, May 17 1945, and Armour to Dunning, April 28, 
1945. 
 111  DP, box 23, file 219, Bulletin No. 3, April 5, 1945. 
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librarians, and journalists. A French-language mailing list of 843 names had also 
been compiled, which included the names of 32 “senior members of the Roman 
Catholic Hierarchy,” reflective of the Committee’s efforts to disseminate its stud-
ies effectively within the predominantly French-Catholic society of Quebec.  112  
 Efforts were also made to forge relationships with economists, both inside and 
outside academia. Most conspicuous among these efforts in 1945 was a confer-
ence organized by the CCIR in late November and early December at McGill 
University. Eleven Committee members from Montreal hosted the event, which 
was organized for a group of nearly 30 “visiting economists,” mostly academ-
ics.  113  At the opening dinner at the Mount Royal Hotel on November 29, Dun-
ning, “on behalf of the Committee, made a brief speech in which he welcomed 
the guests and outlined the purpose of the work of the Committee.” McGill prin-
cipal Cyril James followed to explain “the genesis of the Committee.”  114  In the 
days that followed, conference participants – including Jackson and his team 
of research associates, which had grown to include economics professor J. L. 
McDougall of Queen’s University and others – discussed the various memo-
randa of the Committee. Academic in tone, the discussions involved compet-
ing viewpoints, but were mostly of a limited, technical nature. The Committee 
members in attendance, Dunning reported, “were all convinced that the gath-
ering had value and certainly it produced a most sympathetic attitude on the 
part of the visitors toward the work the Committee is trying to do, as well as 
disarming a great deal of the criticism of ‘big business’ which emanates from 
such quarters.”  115  Hearing of the conference’s success, Massey-Harris president 
James S. Duncan expressed to Dunning his “wholehearted agreement with the 
Committee’s method of approach,” which he considered “much more effective 
than ... more direct methods.”  116  Like so much of the Committee’s work, the 
surface appearance of non-political activity was, in fact, the product of planned 
activism designed to sway opinion among intellectuals. 
 By mid-1946, it was clear that postwar reconstruction would not result in any 
immediate or fundamental threat to private enterprise, and a catastrophic post-
war recession never materialized. The Committee’s original task appeared ful-
filled. As the business executives turned to consider the CCIR’s short history and 
its prospective future, they accorded Gilbert Jackson considerable praise. Ross 
McMaster privately attributed the Committee’s success to Jackson: “His unbiased 
opinion, his wide reputation and his ability as an interesting speaker and other 
qualifications have provided the means of reaching the news columns of the press 
to an extent not attainable except through an independent spokesman.”  117  James 
 112  DP, box 23, file 219, Progress Report, Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction, December 29, 
1945. 
 113  DP, box 24, file 221, Jackson to Dunning, December 15, 1945. 
 114  DP, box 24, file 221, see the Hansard (pp. 1-2) attached to Jackson to Crabtree, December 17, 1945. 
 115  DP, box 24, file 221, Dunning to Wallace Campbell, December 17, 1945. 
 116  DP, box 24, file 220, Duncan to Dunning, December 26, 1945. 
 117  DP, box 25, file 224, McMaster to Dunning, September 6, 1946. 
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Duncan expressed similar sentiments, declaring: “our work, which has found 
expression through the booklets, pamphlets and speeches published or delivered 
by Gilbert Jackson, has played an important part in awakening public opinion 
in Canada to some of the difficulties of our present situation and the hazards of 
the future.” “To my mind,” he continued, “the really valuable factor in our Com-
mittee is Gilbert Jackson himself.”  118  “In Gilbert Jackson we have a man whom 
I believe the public trust,” observed General Motors of Canada president R. S. 
McLaughlin, who believed that the Committee’s work, “particularly regarding 
what the public will have to pay out for many, many years in taxes, has been 
instrumental in blocking certain socialistic schemes which we know were in the 
immediate offing.”  119  Though somewhat laconic, these endorsements revealed a 
very strong belief in Jackson’s effectiveness and the Committee’s overall politi-
cal strategy. They also confirm Jackson’s leadership in the CCIR. The growing 
importance of “expertise” in public debate enhanced the importance of intellectu-
als such as Jackson, who operated with a considerable amount of autonomy even 
while dependent upon the financial resources of business executives.  120  
 A few members, including J. W. McConnell, believed the CCIR’s work was 
essentially accomplished and that the group should be dissolved, but the major-
ity concluded otherwise, envisioning the organization’s role in healing a postwar 
world that was threatening to drift away from the moorings of free enterprise.  121  
“Punitive taxation” threatened to stifle the initiative of the entrepreneurial leaders 
of the future, claimed Ross McMaster, who lamented the appearance of “politi-
cal class consciousness” and the power of “the great majority” to interfere with 
the meritocratic functioning of the market economy: “the Income Tax collector 
spares no class, and treats with the mildest strokes the great majority who are 
now enjoying a Roman holiday and, as a consequence, cry for more and more.”  122  
When the Committee was rechristened as the Canadian Council for Economic 
Studies at a meeting in June 1947, “[i]t was agreed that the Committee should be 
continued without substantial change in its original purpose.”  123  W. W. Goforth, a 
former student of Jackson’s, had left the position of Deputy Director of Defence 
Research with the federal government to become the group’s secretary to replace 
Stuart Armour, who had vacated the position late in 1946 to become economic 
advisor to the president of Stelco.  124  Movement between business, government, 
and academia was common and easy for Jackson and his professional associates. 
As well, several new members joined, such as Canadian Bank of Commerce 
 118  DP, box 25, file 222, Duncan to Dunning, August 14, 1946. 
 119  DP, box 25, file 224, McLaughlin to Dunning, August 15, 1946. 
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Mont Pèlerin ,  passim . 
 121  DP, box 25, file 224, McConnell to Dunning, August 16, 1946. 
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 123  DP, box 17, file 162, Minutes, Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction, June 10, 1947. 
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president A. E. Arscott. Harold Crabtree, president of the Howard Smith Paper 
Company, took over as chairman of the renamed group from Dunning, who had 
asked to step down. Dunning went over the group’s accomplishments at the June 
1947 meeting. The Minutes read: 
 It was pointed out by the Honourable Charles A. Dunning that the Council’s small 
mailing list, of about 3,500 carefully selected names, has been gradually built up 
during a period of more than three years. The list is largely composed of parliamen-
tarians, publicists and editorial writers, economists and other teachers in universities 
and secondary colleges, ministers of religion in the principal cities, industrialists 
and financiers, senior civil servants, institutional and labour economists. Moreover, 
the present list was compiled after personal visits and discussions with many of the 
individuals concerned, and the periodic mailing of printed and other memoranda 
would continue to be sustained by systematic interviews and personal correspon-
dence, on the part of the Consultant and Secretary. In his view, there had already 
been satisfactory evidence that the material distributed, together with the interviews 
and public addresses of the Council’s staff and consultants, had been reflected in the 
broad character of public discussion, in the press of the Dominion, in parliamentary 
debate, and in the thinking of senior government officials.  125  
 It was little wonder that Dunning, McMaster, and others wished to see the orga-
nization live on. 
 VI 
 With the onset of the Cold War, Jackson more directly privileged economic free-
dom over political freedom, evincing a trajectory that was very much in line 
with the neoliberal renovation of classical liberalism, which greatly constrained 
the acceptable scope of political freedom and toleration of dissent. Whereas he 
had years earlier, in 1931, defended the rights of Communists to speak “without 
hindrance” as fundamental to the British liberal tradition, in 1946 Jackson was 
warning a gathering of the insurance industry in Chicago that Communists could 
no longer be dismissed as a “corporal’s guard” of “mostly crackpots” who, “from 
time to time, marshaled their supporters in the polling stations.”  126  Zealously 
single-minded and disciplined, warned Jackson, Communists had been active 
in western countries infiltrating various spheres of civil society.  127  Embracing a 
 125  DP, box 17, file 162, Minutes, Canadian Committee on Industrial Reconstruction, June 10, 1947. 
 126  Gilbert E. Jackson, Letter to the Editor, “Prof. Jackson Defends Letter in ‘Free Speech’ Controversy,”  Globe 
(Toronto), January 23, 1931, p. 4; Gilbert E. Jackson  1848 to 1948: How Should We Celebrate the First 
Hundred Years of Communism? (pamphlet issued by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, c.1947), p. 10. 
 127  Jackson,  1848 to 1948 , pp. 10-15. Jackson’s friend, Tracy Philipps, a British intelligence officer and a self-
described “applied-anthropologist” with wide colonial experience, including in Canada during the early 
1940s with the Nationalities Branch and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, declared the speech – later 
published as a pamphlet by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce – “precisely the doctor’s prescription for 
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Cold War mentality and idiom, Jackson decidedly backed away from his earlier 
toleration of political dissent.  128  A former University of Toronto colleague later 
reminisced that Jackson had become “more and more reactionary, almost para-
noid on the subject of communism.”  129  
 Jackson continued his efforts to build links between economists and business. 
“There is,” Jackson had explained privately to Dunning in June 1946, “in the long 
view, no group which does more to shape popular opinion than the one hundred and 
fifty teaching economists in Canadian universities.” Troubled by the “moral skepti-
cism” of academic economists and their “close fraternization” with government 
bureaucrats, which had provided “a fresh allure to ‘planning’,” Jackson argued 
that “the building of a bridge between the teaching economist in his classroom and 
the man of business downtown” be an aim of the group’s efforts in the future.  130  
While the Council did later support some university research, Jackson himself 
was probably a more important connection linking the business and academic 
worlds.  131  Continuing to operate as a professional economist in the hire of the 
Council, Jackson was as active as ever until the mid-1950s, and his consulting firm 
was contracted by large corporations – such as General Motors of Canada, Cana-
dian General Electric, and Stelco – for advice in contract negotiations with unions 
and to prepare economic briefs for conciliation boards.  132  In the context of labour 
negotiations, economics was more than a disinterested science, but a weapon. One 
memorandum that emanated from Jackson’s offices provided this concise piece of 
advice: “The Union should be taught a basic lesson in economics.”  133  
 Though the Council expanded its mailing list to include significant interna-
tional coverage and retained an impressive membership list by the end of the 
1940s (see Tables 1 and 2), during the early 1950s the Council began to erode. 
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Table 1: Canadian Council for Economic Studies, Membership List, September 2, 1949
Arscott, Allan E. (Honorary Member); Chairman, Canadian Bank of Commerce; Toronto
Borden, Henry; President, Brazilian Traction, Light & Power Company Limited; Toronto
Burton, E. G., President, Simpsons Limited; Toronto
Crabtree, Harold; (Immediate Past Chairman); Chairman, Howard Smith Paper Mills, 
 Limited; Montreal
Cross, Arthur (Vice Chairman); Chairman, Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation 
 Limited; Montreal
Dobson, Sydney G.; President, Royal Bank of Canada; Montreal
Duncan, James S. (Chairman); President and General Manager, Massey-Harris 
 Company Limited; Toronto
Dunning, Charles A.; Chairman, Ogilvie Flour Mills Company Limited; Montreal
Gardiner, B. C.; President, Bank of Montreal; Montreal
Gordon, G. Blair; President, Dominion Textile Company Limited; Montreal
Hahn, Major James; President, John Inglis Company Limited; Toronto
Harkness, Colonel R. D.; President, Northern Electrical Company Limited; Montreal
Hilton, H. G.; President, Steel Company of Canada Limited; Hamilton
Huggett, George W. (Montreal Member of Executive); Chairman, Canadian Industries 
 Limited; Montreal
James, F. Cyril (Non-Subscribing Member); Principal and Vice-Chancellor, McGill 
 University; Montreal
Johnson, Frederick; President, Bell Telephone Company of Canada Limited; Montreal
Johnson, J. D.; Chairman, Canada Cement Company Limited; Montreal
Lawson, Hugh (Toronto Member of Executive); Vice-President, York Knitting Mills 
 Limited; Toronto
Mather, W. A.; President, Canadian Pacific Railway; Montreal
McLaughlin, Colonel R. S. (Honorary Member); Chairman, General Motors of Canada 
 Limited; Oshawa
McMaster, Ross H. (Honorary Member); Chairman, Steel Company of Canada; Montreal
Murdoch, James Y.; President, Noranda Mines Limited; Toronto
Partridge, A. G.; President, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company of Canada Limited; Toronto
Phillips, Colonel Eric; President, Duplate Canada Limited; Toronto
Powell, R. E.; President, Aluminum Company of Canada Limited; Montreal
Smith, Sidney (Non-Subscribing Member); President, University of Toronto; Toronto
Stavert, R. E.; President, Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada 
 Limited; Montreal
Wallace, R. C. (Non-Subscribing Member); Principal and Vice-Chancellor, Queen’s 
 University; Kingston
Wecker, William A.; President and General Manager, General Motors of Canada 
 Limited; Oshawa
Wedd, Stanley M. (Treasurer); President, Canadian Bank of Commerce; Toronto
Source: DP, box 17, file 166.
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Table 2: Canadian Council for Economic Studies: Analysis of Mailing List, January 14, 1949
Canadian
Eng-spkg Fr-spkg UK USA
Other 
Foreign TOTAL
I. BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL 
EXECUTIVES
1. Council Members (inclu. Hon.) 25 25
2. Council Research Associates, 
etc.
27 2 2 1 32
3. ER Canadian Industrial and 
Commercial Executives
853 168 1,021
4. ER Canadian Financial 
Institution Executives 
185 16 201
5. ER Chartered Bank Managers 
and Supervisors (selected)
362 84 446
6. ER Publishers and Editors 128 43 6 8 185
7. Senior Officers and Executive 
Directors of the International 
Bank and Monetary Fund
41 41
8. Economists, Institutional 36 6 18 2 62
9. ER Miscellaneous, Business 440 311 44 53 12 860
Subtotal 2,056 624 58 121 14 2,873
II. EDUCATORS AND CLERGY
10. ER Presidents and Deans of 
Universities and Colleges
94 18 6 118
11. ER Economists, academic 98 6 18 43 8 173
12. Other university professors 149 9 2 6 166
13. High School and Collegiate 
Principals (selected)
48 48
14. ER Principal Clergy: 
Protestant
354 354
15. Principal Clergy: Roman 
Catholic
56 278 14 348
16. Librarians 88 18 2 3 111
Subtotal 887 329 22 72 8 1,318
III. LEGISLATORS
17. Senators (Canada) 74 22 96
18. House of Commons (Canada) 177 68 245
19. ER Provincial Legislatures 
and Councils
373 79 452
20. Senators, USA (81st Congress) 96 96
21. Representatives, USA (81st 
Congress)
435 435
Subtotal 624 169 531 1,324
(Continued)
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Dominion Steel president Lionel Forsyth and Royal Bank of Canada president 
James Muir left the group in 1953, unconvinced of the Council’s effectiveness.  134  
Meanwhile, Blair Gordon, president of Dominion Textiles, and Hugh Lawson, 
vice-president of York Knitting Mills, had also resigned, but “for budgetary rea-
sons, probably not unconnected with the recession in textiles.”  135  In early 1954, 
after Stelco president H. G. Hilton took over from James Duncan as chairman, 
plans were laid to develop a wider membership and produce studies “expressed 
in language more readily understandable to the average citizen.”  136  The atrophy 
of the organization continued, however, until finally, in 1956, the Council was 
disbanded.  137  This ending was evidence of the specific political emergency for 
which the group had been formed. Once the emergency subsided, so too did the 
 134  DP, box 18, file 171, J. S. Duncan to W. A. Mather, president, Canadian Pacific Railway, June 11, 1953. 
 135  Ibid. and draft letter, J. S. Duncan, June 4, 1953. 
 136  DP, box 18, file 173, Duncan to Dunning, February 4, 1954. 
 137  DP, box 19, file 179, H. G. Hilton to Members of the Canadian Council for Economic Studies, May 18, 
1956, and file 180, James Stewart to Dunning, November 27, 1957. 
Canadian
Eng-spkg Fr-spkg UK USA
Other 
Foreign TOTAL
IV. JUDGES AND 
MAGISTRATES
22. Justices of County and Higher 
Courts (selected)
79 23 102
23. Mayors 72 26 98
24. Police Magistrates 233 91 324
Subtotal 384 140 524
V. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
25. ER Dominion (Federal) 
officials, incl. economists
185 65 4 8 10 272
26. ER Provincial officials 142 44 186
27. Municipal, etc. 29 7 36
Subtotal 356 116 4 8 10 494
VI. LABOUR LEADERS AND 
MISCELLANEOUS
28. Labour Leaders (selected) 671 41 35 747
29. ER Miscellaneous, other 47 70 15 61 14 131
Subtotal 718 70 15 61 14 878
TOTALS 5,025 1,448 99 793 46 7,411
Note: Underlined items are new in 1948; ER refers to sections extensively revised in 1948.
Source: Document copied from DP, box 17, file 165.
Table 2: (Continued)
202 Histoire sociale / Social History
group’s sense of mission. Other factors also played a role. A personal conflict 
between Jackson and the Council’s secretary appears to have hastened the final 
decision to dissolve the organization.  138  Also, business-related conflict emerged 
as the Council was wound up in 1956: Eric Phillips – as a member of the Argus 
group alongside E. P. Taylor – aligned with American investors to force fel-
low Council member and former chairman, James Duncan, from the presidency 
of Massey-Ferguson.  139  However, division and dissolution was not pervasive. 
At least a few Council members, including the group’s chairman H. G. Hil-
ton, Alcan president R. E. Powell, and Canadian Bank of Commerce chairman 
James Stewart, transferred their leftover contributions in the Council’s coffers 
to the Canadian-American Committee, an internal membership committee of 
the Private Planning Association of Canada; this Canadian-American organiza-
tion would sponsor studies on “global trade liberalization” throughout the 1960s 
before being merged with the C. D. Howe Memorial Foundation in 1973 to 
become the C. D. Howe Institute.  140  When the Council disbanded, the major-
ity agreed that the group should “continue to get together three or four times a 
year” for informal meetings.  141  The CCIR thus linked forward beyond its formal 
existence. 
 Jackson’s ongoing work on wages, productivity, and inflation also gained 
purchase. During the mid-twentieth century, at a time when organized labour 
enjoyed considerable strength, Jackson warned against the economic perils of 
high wage rates, writing during the 1950 railway strike that “the more success-
ful the demands of organized labour for increased wages, the more inexorably 
must the cost of living rise.”  142  Inflation, Jackson argued, was a tax upon the 
community born of the excessive demands (and power) of organized labour.  143  
 138  DP, box 19, file 179, W. W. Goforth to H. G. Hilton, January 11, 1956, and Jackson to Dunning, May 28, 
1956. 
 139  See Libbie and Frank Park,  Anatomy of Big Business (Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, 1973 [1962]), 
pp. 183-187; James S. Duncan , Not a One-Way Street: The Autobiography of James S. Duncan (Toronto: 
Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1971), pp. 147-151 and 209. 
 140  Alan Ernst, “From Liberal Continentalism to Neoconservatism: North American Free Trade and the Politics 
of the C. D. Howe Institute,”  Studies in Political Economy , vol. 39 (Autumn 1992), pp. 116-121; DP, box 
19, file 180, James Stewart, Chairman, Canadian Bank of Commerce, to Dunning, November 27, 1957. 
 141  DP, box 19, file 179, Hilton to Members of the Canadian Council for Economic Studies, May 18, 1956. 
 142  DP, box 39, file 328, Gilbert Jackson, “Lessons for Canada from the Railway Strike of 1950” (May 1951; 
originally published in two parts in  Manufacturing and Industrial Engineering , March and April 1951), 
p. 10. 
 143  See, for example, DP, box 39, file 331, Gilbert Jackson, “Whither the Rate of Interest?”  The Commerce 
Journal (February 1957): “It is tragic to reflect that the defenceless victims of inflation – the pensioners 
and annuitants, widows and others living on income from trustee securities, owners of insurance policies 
which are in large part, or wholly backed by securities yielding a fixed income – these are for the most part 
‘old folk’; and that with each passing year, victims constitute an increasing percentage of our population.” 
Jackson later describes the source of the inflationary pressure: “For apart and distinct from the successive 
inflationary pressures originating in the market for capital funds, which we must expect from henceforth, 
there is present among us almost continuously, the pressure of Organised Labour for larger annual rates of 
increase, in productivity per man hour.” See also Gilbert Jackson,  Wage Rates and the Growth of Output Per 
Man Hour: More Thoughts in a Time of Transition (Toronto, June 1953). 
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The  Globe and Mail credited him as perhaps the first economist in Canada to 
argue “that wage increases for labor could not and should not outstrip increases 
in productivity.” His writings on wages and productivity had, the  Globe and Mail 
declared after Jackson’s death in 1959, become “standard references in the field 
[of economics],” and his views on inflation were “gaining wide acceptance in 
business and finance.” He “preached a rugged individualism in economic and 
public affairs, which left its mark on the political economy of the nation,” having 
been “one of the most influential men in Canada, although the nature of his work 
and his own personality left him relatively unknown.”  144  
 While growing public anxiety over American influence in the Canadian econ-
omy coalesced into a left-nationalism during the 1960s and 1970s that would 
pose new political challenges to Jackson’s ideology, he conceived of his task as 
one that would take “at least one or two generations” to accomplish.  145  Jackson’s 
activism does indeed appear rather more successful over the  longue durée of the 
twentieth century, and his activities demonstrate continuity in business activism 
and free-market ideals that has not been fully recognized. 
 VII 
 The role of the CCIR in supporting Jackson’s work has passed unacknowledged, 
if not entirely unknown, by historians. Jackson’s close connections with many 
of the country’s most powerful capitalist interests reveal the decidedly political 
nature of his work with the CCIR, a group that Jackson himself described as 
“a very delicate experiment in the public relations of large scale enterprise.”  146  
In the 1930s Canadian big business waged its political defence of capitalism 
and liberal individualism directly and in public, as conservative business leaders 
such as Edward Beatty and  Globe and Mail president and publisher C. George 
McCullagh made direct – but ultimately ineffective – appeals to politicians and 
the public.  147  Canadian business executives moved their political activism to the 
more secretive private sphere in the 1940s through the CCIR. Rather than Com-
mittee members appearing before the public as advocates of their ideas, Gilbert 
Jackson served as their public face: allowing Jackson to speak for them, the 
membership of the CCIR harnessed an expert credibility that would have been 
otherwise unattainable, especially at a moment when the legitimacy of big busi-
ness remained low. This maintenance of secrecy was so successful that, when W. 
 144  “Gilbert Jackson, Consulting Economist, Dies,”  Globe and Mail , June 17, p. 2. 
 145  DP, box 23, file 218, Jackson to J. S. McLean, letter draft, n.d. [internal evidence indicates that the letter 
was prepared in May 1944]. The importance of left-nationalism in accounting for distinct Canadian and 
American trajectories in capital-labour relations is argued in Steven High’s comparative study of deindus-
trialization,  Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2002). 
 146  DP, box 25, file 224, Jackson to Dunning, June 12, 1946. 
 147  For Beatty, see Nerbas, “The Politics of Capital,” pp. 190-260 and  passim ; for McCullagh, see Brian J. 
Young, “C. George McCullagh and the Leadership League,”  Canadian Historical Review , vol. 47, no. 3 
(September 1966), pp. 201-266. 
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W. Goforth travelled to the United States in 1953 to meet with representatives 
of business think tanks that included representatives from the Brookings Institu-
tion and the Committee for Economic Development, the people with whom he 
met “were surprised that the Canadian Council has been able to remain a private 
body, ... [and] [t]hey envied the closer ‘family atmosphere’ which we can achieve 
in a much smaller country and which has enabled such a private study group as 
the Canadian Council to function.”  148  
 This new politics of big business, however, also enhanced the importance and 
autonomy of the intellectual in the business community’s efforts to mobilize. 
Jackson was less a straightforward spokesperson for big business as a partner 
by virtue of a coalescence of ideological and political aims. Indeed, as with his 
efforts to convince J. Stanley McLean of the correctness of the CCIR’s strate-
gies and aims, Jackson believed his role was to broaden the perspective of busi-
nesspeople to make clearer the fault lines of ideological battle. The result was a 
new type of elite politics, more opaque and dependent upon “expertise” and less 
focused upon politicians and political parties than before. This study suggests 
that the straightforward economic interests of big business can only partially 
explain its politics and relationship to the broader realignments of the political 
right after the Second World War. The expert-intellectual’s capacities to build 
networks, produce knowledge, and frame public debate conceivably served as 
powerful tools that altered the architecture of business activism. Gilbert Jackson 
wielded those tools with considerable autonomy in defence of capitalism and 
economic liberalism. The result was a form of politics that shared much in com-
mon with the contemporaneous activism of self-conscious neoliberals, includ-
ing a deep wariness of the supposed “pathologies of democracy.”  149  Privileging 
economic freedom over political freedom, Jackson and the CCIR viewed the 
management of democracy as a duty necessary to sustain the moral order of the 
market, signalling an important development in elite political mobilization and 
its relationship to the public sphere during a critical moment in the middle years 
of the twentieth century. 
 148  DP, box 18, file 171, Wallace Goforth, “Notes on six independent economic research bodies in the United 
States” (November 1953), p. 9. 
 149  Mirowski, “Defining Neoliberalism,” p. 443. 
